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[Sac. No. 6416. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1953.] 
WILLIAM R. GRANT, Appellant, v. FRANK H. Mc-
AULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent. 
[Sac. No. 6417. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1953] 
RUSSELL M. MANCHESTER, Appellant, v. FRANK H. 
McAULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent. 
~Sae. No. 6418. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1953.] 
DOYLE O. JENSEN, Appellant, v. FRANK H. Mc-
AULIFFE, as Administrator, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Conl1ict of Laws-Torts.-In actions on torts occuring abroad, 
courts of this state determine substantive matters inherent 
in cause of action by adopting as their own the law of place 
where tortious acts occurred, unless it is contrary to public 
policy of this state. 
[2] Id.-Torts.-No court can enforce any law but that of its 
own sovereign and, when a suitor comes to a jurisdiction 
foreign to place of tort, he can only invoke an obligation 
recognized by that sovereign. 
[8] Id.-Torts.-The forum does not adopt as its own the pro-
cedural law of place where tortious acts occur. 
[4] Death - Wrongful Death - Nature of Aetion.-A cause of 
action for wrongful death is statutory; it is a new cause of 
action vested in widow or next" of kin, and arises on death of 
injured person; it is to be distinguished from separate cause 
of action which injured person has before death and which, 
if such cause of action survives, can be enforced by personal 
representative of deceased against tort feasor. 
[6] Abatement - Death of Pa.rty - Survival of Actions - Tort 
Actions.-Survival statutes do not create a new cause of action, 
[1] State or country d'lemed to be place of tort causing personal 
injury or death, as regards principle that law of place of tort 
governs, note, 133 A.L.R. 260. See, also, Ca1.Jur.2d, Conflict of 
Laws, § 79 et seq.; Am.Jur., Conflict of Laws, § 180 et seq. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Abatement and Revival, § 63 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Abatement and Revival, § 84 et seq. 
HcX. Dig. References: [1-3] Conflict of Laws, §13; [4] Death, 
112; [5, 9-13, 15] Abatement, § 42; [6] Abatement, 142; Limita-
tion of Actions, § 16; [7] Limitation of Actions, § 16; [8] Statutes, 
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as do wrongful death statutes; they merely prevent abatement 
of cause of action of injured person, and provide for its en-
forcement by or against personal representative of deceased. 
ld.-Death of Party: Limitation of Actions-Law Governing.-
Survival statutes are analagous of statutes to limitations, 
which are procedural for conflict of law purposes and are 
governed by domestic law of forum. 
Limitation of Actions-Law Governing.-A cause of action aris-
ing in another state, by laws of which an action cannot be 
maintained thereon because of lapse of time, can be enforced 
in California by a citizen of this state if he has held cause of 
action from time it accrued. (Code Civ. Proc., § 361.) 
[8] Statutes - Classification. - "Substance" and "procedure" are 
not legal concepts of invariable content, and a statute or other 
rule of law will be characterized as substantive or procedural 
according to nature of problem fOT which a characterization 
must be made. 
[9] Abatement-Death of Party......; Survival of Actions - Revival 
Distinguished.-Purported distinction between survival of 
causes of action as substantive and revival of actions as pro-
cedural is not a valid one, since in most "revival" 4itatutes 
substitution of a personal representative in place of deceased 
party is expressly conditioned on survival of cause of action 
itself. 
[10] ld.-Death of Party-Survival of Actions-Tort Actions.-
H cause of action dies with tort feasor, a pending proceeding 
must be abated; a personal representative cannot be sub-
stituted in place of deceased party unless cause of action is 
still subsisting. 
[11] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law 
Governs.-Survival of causes of action should be governed by 
law of fornID. 
[12] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law 
Governs.-Survival is not an essential part of cause of action 
itself but relates to procedures available for enforcement of 
legal claims for damages; basically the question is one of ad-
ministration of decedents' estates, which is a purely local 
proceeding. 
[18] ld. - Death of Party - SurviVal of Actions - What Law 
Governs.-Responsibilities of defendant, as administrator of 
decedent's estate, for injuries inflicted by decedent before his 
death are governed by laws of this state and not by t)1I)II" of 
state in which injuries occurred. 
[14] ld.-Death of Party-Survival of Actions-Actions for Pel'-
sonal Injuries.-The common-law doctrine actio "er"onaZ~ 
moritur cum per,QfIG had its origin in a penal concept of ~ 
) 
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liability, whereas today tort liabilities of sort involved in 
actions against administrator of decedent's estate for injuries 
caused by alleged negligence of decedent are regarded as com-
pensatory. 
{l5] ld. - Death of Party - Survival of Actions - What Law 
Governs.-Where all three plaintiffs, as wen a deceased tort 
feasor, were residents of California at time of automobile acci-
dent in Arizona, and estate of deceased tort feasor is being 
administered in California, plaintiffs' right to prosecute their 
causes of action against such estate for damages for alleged 
negligence of dccensed is governed by laws of this state relat-
ing to administration of estates. 
APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of Plumas 
County abating actions on claims against an estate. William 
M. Macmillan, Judge. Orders reversed. 
J. Oscar Goldstein, P. M. Barceloux, Burton J. Goldstein 
and Goldstein, Barceloux & Goldstein for Appellants. 
Honey & Mayall and John J. Hurley for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On December 17, 1949, plaintiffs W. R. 
Grant and R. M. Manchester were riding west on United 
States Highway 66 in an automobile owne.d and driven by 
plaintiff D. O. Jensen. Defendant's decedent, W. W. Pullen, 
was driving his automobile east on the same highway. The 
two automobiles collided at a point approximately 15 miles 
east of Flagstaff, Arizona. J ensen'~ automobile was badly 
damaged, and Jensen, Grant, and Manchester suffered per-
sonal injuries. Nineteen days later, on January 5, 1950, 
Pullen died as a result of injuries received in the collision. 
Defendant McAuliffe was appointed administrator of his 
estate and letters testamentary were issued by the Superior 
Court of Plumas County. All three plaintiffs, as well as 
Pullen, were residents of California at the time of the col-
Jision. After the appointment of defendant, each plaintiff 
presented his claim for damages. Defendant rejected all three 
claims, and on December 14, 1950, each plaintiff filed an action 
. against the estate of Pullen to recover damages for the injuries 
caused by the alleged negligence of the decedent. Defendant 
filed a general demurrer and a motion to abate each of the com-
plaints. The trial court entered an order granting the motion 
in each case. Each plaintiff has appealed. The appeals are 
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based on the same ground and have therefor6 been con-
solidated. 
The basic question is whether plaintiffs' causes of action 
against Pullen survived his death and are maintainable against 
his estate. The statutes of this state provide that causes of 
action for negligent torts survive the death of the tort feasor 
and can be maintained against the administrator or executor 
of his estate. (Civ. Code, § 956; Code Civ. Proc., § 385; Prob. 
Code, §§ 573, 574.) Defendant contends, however, that the 
survival of a cause of action is a matter of substantive law, 
and that the courts of this state must apply the law of Arizona 
governing survival of causes of action. There is no provision 
for surnval of causes of action in the statutes of Arizona, 
although there is a provision that in the event of the death 
of a party to a pending proceeding his personal representative 
can be substituted as a party to the action (Arizona Code, 
1939, § 21-534), if the cause of action survives. (Arizona 
Code, 1939. § 21-530.) The Supreme Court of Arizona has 
held that if a tort action has not been commenced before the 
death of the tort feasor a plea in abatement must be sustained. 
(McOlure v. Johnson, 50 Ariz. 76, 82 [69 P.2d 573]. See, 
also, McLellan v. Au,tomobile Ins. 00. of Hartford, Oonn., 
80 F.2d 344.) 
[1] Thus, the answer to the question whether the causes 
of action against Pullen survived and are maintainable against 
his estate depends on whether Arizona or California law ap-
plies. In actions on torts occurring abroad, the courts of this 
state determine the substantive matters inherent in the cause 
of action by adopting as their own the law of the place where 
the torti(lus acts occurred, unless it is contrary to the public 
policy of this state. (Loranger v. Nadeau, 215 Cal. 362 [10 
P.2d 63. S4 A.L.R. 1264].) [2] "[N]o court can enforce any 
law but that of its own sovereign, and. when a suitor comes 
to a jurisdiction foreign to the place of the tort, he can only 
invoke an obligation recognized by that sovereign. A foreign 
sovereign under civilized law imposes an obligation of its 
own as J.:early homologous as possible to that arising in the 
place where the tort occurs." (Learned Hand, J., in Guin-
"ess v. Miller, 291 F. 769, 770.) [3] But the forum does 
not adopt as its own the procedural law of the place where 
the tortiJus acts occur. It must, therefore, be determined 
whether survival of causes of action is procedural or substan-
tive for tOnflict of laws purposes. 
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This question is one of first impression in this state. The 
precedents in other jurisdictions are conflicting. In many 
cases it has been held that the survival of a cause of action 
is a matter of substance and that the law of the place where 
the tortious acts occurred must be applied to determine the 
question. (Burg v. Knox, 334 Mo. 329, 335-338 [67 S.W.2d 
96]; Chubbuck v. Holloway, 182 Minn. 225, 227-230 [234 
N. W. 314, 868], followed in Kerston v. Johnson, 185 Minn. 
591,593 [242 N.W. 329]; Davis v. New York & N. E. R. Co., 
143 Mass. 301, 305-306 [9 N.E. 815]; Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. 
& Pac. Ry. Co., 61 Iowa 441,444 [16 N.W. 351, 47 Am.St.Rep. 
820] [but see Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 
449, 451 [134 N.W. 1057, Ann.Cas. 1915B 113]]; Mextcan 
Cent. Ry. Co. v. Goodman, 20 Tex.Civ.App. 109, 110 [48 S.W. 
778] [but see Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 
378 [4 S.W. 627]]; Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 38 Vt. 
294. 307-311; Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387, 388 [54 S.Ct. 
211. 78 L.Ed. 378], followed in McIntosh v. General Chem. 
Defense Corp., 67 F.Supp. 63, 64, Woollen v. Lorenz, 98 F.2d 
261, 262 [68 App.D.C. 389], Gray v. Blight, 112 F.2d 696. 
697-698, and Muir v. Kessinger, 45 F.Supp. 116, 117; Orr v. 
Ahern, 107 Conn. 174. 178-180 [139 A. 691]: Potter v. First 
Nat. Bank, 107 N.J.Eq. 72. 74-75 [151 A. 546]. fonowed in 
Friedman v. Greenberg, 110 N.J.L. 462, 464-466 [166 A. 119], 
and Rathgebet· v. Sommerhalder. 112 N.J.L. 546. 548-549 
[171 A. 835]; Sumner v. Brown, 312 Pa. 124. 127 [167 A. 
315].) The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, section 390. 
is in accord. It should be noted. however, that the majority 
of the foregoing cases were decided after drafts of the Re-
statement were first circulated in 1929. Before that time. it 
appears that the weight of authority was that survival of 
causes of action is procedural and governed by the domestic 
law of the forum. (Austin v. Pittsburg, C., C., & St. L. Ry. 
Co., 122 Ky. 304, 309-310 r91 S.W. 742J: Baltimore & Ohio 
R. Co. v. Joy, 173 U.S. 226. 231 [19 S.Ct: 387. 43 L.Ed. 677]; 
Clough v. Gardiner, 111 Misc. 244. 248-249 r182 N.Y.S. 803]; 
Herzog v. Stern. 264 N.Y. 379. 383-384 [191 N.E. 23]. fol-
lowed in Demuth v. Griffin. 253 App.Div. 399. 401 [2 N.Y.S. 
2d 2], Domres v. Storms, 236 App.Div. 630 (260 N.Y.S. 335], 
St1verman v. Rappaport. 165 Misc. 543. 545-546 r300 N.Y.S. 
76], Taynton v. Vollmer, 242 App.Div. 854 (275 N.Y.S. 2841: 
Gordon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 154 Iowa 449. 451 [134 
N.W. 1057]: In re V'/,1as' Estate. 166 Ore. 115. 123-124 rno 
P.2d 940]; Martin v. Baltimore d'; Ohio R. Co., 151 U.S. 673, 
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692-693 [14 S.Ot. 533, 38 L.Ed. 311] ; Martin v. Wabash R. 
Co., 142 F. 650, 651 [73 C.C.A. 646, 6 Ann.Cas. 582] ; Page 
v. United Fruit 00.,3 F.2d 747, 754; Matter of Killough, 148 
Misc. 73, 85-89 [265 N.Y.S. 301]; Texas If; Pac. Ry. 00. v. 
Richards, 68 Tex. 375,378 [4 S.W. 627). See, also, Barker v. 
Ladd, Fed.Cas. 990 [3 Sawy. 44] ; Gaskins v. BontUs, 4 F. 
Supp. 547, 551; Luster v. Martin, 58 F.2d 537, 539-540; Port-
land Gold Mining 00. v. Stratton's Independence, Ltd., 196 
F. 714,716-717; Whitten v. Bennett, 77 F. 271, 273; Winslow 
v. Domestic Engineering 00., 20 F.Supp. 578, 579.) Many 
of the cases, decided both before and after the Restatement, 
holding that survival is substantive and must be determined 
by the law of the place where the tortious acts occurred, con-
fused the problems involved in survival of causes of action 
with those involved in causes of action for wrongful death. 
(See, for example, the precedents on which the courts relied 
in Hyde v. Wabash, St. L. If; Pac. Ry. 00., supra, 61 Iowa 
441; Orr v. Ahern, supra, 107 Conn. 174; and Ormsby v. Ohase, 
supra, 290 U.S. 387.) The problems are not analogous. (See 
Schumacher, "Rights of Action Under Death and Survival 
Statutes," 23 Mich.L.Rev. 114, 116-117, 124-125.) [4] A 
cause of action for wrongful death is statutory. It is a new 
cause of action vested in the widow or next of kin, and 
arises on the death of the injured person. Before his 
death, the injured person himself has a separate and distinct 
cause of action and, if it survives, the same cause of action 
can be enforced by the personal representative of the deceased 
against the tort feasor. [6] The survival statutes do not 
create a new cause of action, as do the wrongful death stat-
utes. (Needham v. Grand Trunk Ry. 00., supra, 38 Vt. 294, 
303-306; Austin v. Pittsburg, 0., 0., If; St. L. Ry. 00., supra, 
122 Ky. 304, 308-310; Martin v. Baltimore If; Ohio R. 00., 
supra, 151 U.S. 673, 696, 698, 701; Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 
608, 612-615 [22 S.Ct. 493, 46 L.Ed. 713]; Spring v. Webb, 
227 F. 481, 484-485; 1 C.J.S., p. 211; Schumacher, supra, 23 
Mich.L.Rev. 114, 124-125. The English courts have reached 
the same result in construing similar statutes: Davies v. Powell 
D1tfferin Assoc. Oollieries, Ltd., [1942) A.C. 601, 610-616; 
Rose v. Ford, [1937] A.C. 826, 852, 855-856. See, also, Brad-
shaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. 00., [1875) 10 C.P. 
189, 192-193.) They merely prevent the abatement of the 
cause of action of the injured person, and provide for its 
enforcement by or against the personal representative of the de. 
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are procedural for conflict of laws purposes and are governed 
by the domestic law of the forum. (Biewend v. Bicwend, 17 
Ca1.2d 108, 114 [109 P.2d 701, 132 A.L.R. 1264].) [7] Thus, 
a cause of action arising in another state, by the laws of which 
an action cannot be maintained thereon because of lapse of 
time, can be enforced in California by a citizen of this state, 
if he has held the cause of action from the time it accrued. 
(Code Civ. Proc., § 361; Stewart v.Spaulding, 72 Cal. 264, 
266 [13 P. 661]. See, also. Biewend v. Bicwend, supra-; and 
Western Coal ~ Mining Co. v. Jones, 27 Ca1.2d 819. 828 [167 
P. 719, 164 A.L.R. 685].) 
Defendant contends, however, that the characterization of 
sun'ival of causes of action as substantive or procedural is 
foreclosed by Cort v. Steen, 36 Cal.2d 437, 442 [224 P.2d 723], 
where it was held that the California survival statutes were 
substantive and therefore did not apply retroactively. The 
problem in the present proceeding, however, is not whether 
the survival statutes apply retroactively, but whether they are 
substantive or procedural for purposes of conflict of laws. 
[8] "'Substance' and 'procedure' ... are not legal con-
_ cepts of invariable content" (Black Diamond Steamskip Corp. 
v. Stewart ~ Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 [69 S.Ct. 622,93 L.Ed. 
754]. See, also, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 
[65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079, 160 A.L.R. 1231]; Sampson 
v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 756, 758; Estate of Caravas, 40 
CaUd 38, 41-42 [250 P.2d 593J; W. W. Cook, The Logical 
and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws (1942), c. 6: "Sub-
stance and Procedure"), and a statute or other rule of law will 
be characterized as substantive or lIrocedural according to the 
nature of the problem for which a characterization must be 
mad~. 
[9] Defendant also contends that a distinction must be 
drawn between survival of causes of action and revival of 
actions, and that the former are substantive but the latter 
procedural. On the basis of this distinction, defendant con-
cludes that many of the cases cited above as holding that sur-
vival is procedural and is governed by the domestic law of 
the forum do not support this position, since they involved 
problems of "revival" rather than "survival." The dis-
tinction urged by defendant is not a valid one. Most of the 
statutes invoived in the cases cited provided for the "revival" 
of a pending proceeding by or against the personal represen-
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pending. But in most "revival" statutes, substitution of a 
personal representative in place of a deceased party is. ex-
pressly conditioned on the survil'al of the cause of action 
itself.' [10] If the cause of action dies with the tort feasor, a 
pending proceeding must be abated. A personal representa-
tive cannot be substituted in the place of a deceased party 
unless the cause of action is still subsisting. In cases where 
this substitution ha& occurred, the courts have looked to the 
domestic law of the forum to determine whether the cause of 
action surVlves as well as to determine whether the personal 
representative can be substituted as a party to the action. 
(Gordon v. Chicago, R.I. &; P. Ry. Co., supra, 154 Iowa 449, 
451; :Alartin v. Baltimore &; Ohio R. Co., supra, 151 U.S. 
673, 692; JJartin v. Wabash R. Co., supra, 142 F. 650, 651; 
Baltimore d'i Ohio R. Co. v. Joy, supra, 173 U.S. 226, 231.) 
Defendant's contention would require the courts to look to 
their local statutes to determine "revival" and to the law of 
the place where the tort occurred to determine "survival," 
but we have found no case in which this procedure was fol-
lowed. 
Since we find no compelling weight of authority for either 
alternative, we are free to make a choice on the merits. 
[11] We have concluded that survival of causes of action 
should be governed by the law of the forum. [12] Survival 
is not an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates 
to the procedures available for the enforcement of the legal 
claim for damages. Basically the question is one of the ad-
ministration of decedents' estates, which is a purely local 
proceeding. The problem here is whether the causes of action 
that these plaintiffs had against Pullen before his death sur-
vive as liabilities of his estate. Section 573 of the Probate 
Code provides that "all actions founded • • • upon any lia-
bility for physical injury, death or injury to property, may 
be maintained by or against executors and administrators in 
all cases in which the cause of action ••• is one which would 
not abate upon the death of their respective testators or 
intestates. • • ." Civil Code, section 956, provides that 
lFor example, Code Civ. Proc., 1385: "An action or proceeding does 
not abate by the death, or any disability of a party • • • 'f the cause 
of acfw7I BUTvive or contifltle." (Italics added.) Bee also 28 U.B.C.A .• 
:Rule 25(a) (1) ~leg. hist., U.B.Rev.Stat., § 955 (1874); Judiciary Act 
of 1789, § 31]: • If a party dies /lnd the claim" not thereby ~ti7l0uished, 
the court ••• may order substitution ••• " of the personal representa' 
tive. (Italics added.) The exMt language of :Rule 25 (a) (1) is repeated 
in Arizona Code, 1939, 121·530. 
;' 
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"A thing in action arising out of a wrong which results 
in physical injury to the person ... shall not abate by reason 
of the death of the wrongdoer ... ," and causes of action for 
damage to property are maintainable against executors and 
administrators under section 574 of the Probate Code. (See 
Hunt v. Authier, 28 Cal.2d 288, 292-296 [169 P.2d 913, 171 
A.L.R. 1379]; Cart v. Steen, supra, 36 Ca1.2d 437, 439-440.) 
Decedent's estate is located in this state, and letters of ad-
ministration were issued to defendant by the courts of this 
state. [13] The responsibilities of defendant, as adminis-
trator of Pullen's estate, for injuries inflicted by Pullen be-
fore his death are governed by the laws of this state. This 
approach has been followed in a number of well-reasoned 
cases. (Matter of Killough, supra, 148 Misc. 73, 85-89; Her-
zog v. Stern, supra, 264 N.Y. 379; In re Vilas' Estate, supra, 
166 Ore. 115; Martin v. Baltimore &; Ohio R. Co., supra, 151 
U.S. 673; Whitten v. Bennett, supra, 77 F. 271, 273.) It 
retains control of the administration of estates by the local 
Legislature and avoids the problems involved in determining 
the administrator's amenability to suit under the laws of other 
states. [14] The common law doctrine actio personalis 
moritur cum persona had its origin in a penal concept of tort 
liability. (See Prosser, Law of Torts 950-951; PoIlock. The 
Law of Torts (10th ed.) 64, 68.) Today, tort liabilities of the 
sort involved in these actions are regarded as compensatory. 
[15] When, as in the present case, all of the parties were 
residents of this state, and the estate of the deceased tort 
feasor is being administered in this state, plaintiff's right 
to prosecute their causes of act.ion is governed by the laws 
of this state relating to administration of estates. 
The orders granting defendant's motions to abate are re-
versed, and the causes remanded for further proceedings. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In Cart v. Steen (1950),36 Cal. 
2d 437, 442 [224 P.2d 723], this court held that under the 
doctrine of nonsurvivability the abatement of an action by 
the death of the injured person through the tort feasor's act 
or otherwise. or by the death of the tort feasor, abates the 
wrong as well; that the effect of a survival statute is to create 
a right or cause of action rather than to either continue an 
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vued for the redress of an existing wrong; and that conse-
quently a survival statute enacted after death of the tort 
feasor did not apply to the tort or cause of action involved. 
And more recently, in Estate 0/ ArbuUck (1953), Gnte, pp. 
86, 88-89 [257 P.2d 433], we recognized the rule that the 
burden of proof provisions of the Probate Code sections (259 
., ,eg.) dealing with reciprocal inheritance rights are not 
merely procedural in nature, but, rather, are substantive stat-
utes regulating succession, and that consequently such rights 
are to be determined by the law as it existed on the date of 
decedent's death. (See, also, Estate of GiordGno (1948), 85 
Oal.App.2d 588, 592, 594 [193P.2d 771].) 
Irreconcilably inconsistent with the cases cited in the pre-
eeding paragraph, the majority now hold that "Survival is 
DOt an essential part of the cause of action itself but relates 
to the procedures available for the enforcement of the legal 
elaim for damages. Basically the question is one of the ad-
ministration of decedents' estates, which is II. purely local 
proceeding." If the above stated holding is to prevail, then 
for the sake of the law's integrity and clarity, and in fair-
ness to lower courts and to counsel, the cited cases should be 
expressly overruled. But even more regrettable than the fail-
ure to either follow or unequivocally overrule the cited cases 
is the character of the "rule" which is now promulgated: the 
majority assert that henceforth "a statute or other rule of 
law will be characterized as substantive or procedural accord-
ing to the nature of the problem for which a characterization 
must be made," thus suggesting that the court will no longer 
be bound to consistent enforcement or uniform application 
of "a statute or other rule of law" but will instead apply one 
"rule" or another as the untrammeled whimsy of the ma-
jority may from time to time dictate, "according to the nature 
of the problem" as they view it in a given case. This COD-
cept of the majority strikes deeply at what has been our proud 
boast that ours waS a government of laws rather than of men. 
Although any administration of an estate in . the. courts of 
this state is local in a procedural sense, the rights and elaims 
both in favor of and against such an estate are substantive 
in. nature, and vest irrevocably at the date of death. (E,ttde 
of PGtter,Ofl (1909),155 Cal. 626, 634 [102 P. 941, 132 Am. 
St.Rep. 116, 18 Ann.Cas. 625, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 654].) Since 
this court has clearly held that a right or cause of actiOD 
created by a survival statute is likewise substantive, rather 
than procedural, we should hold, if we would follow the law, 
